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November 16, 2009
Abstract. In this paper, we use survey data to analyze the accuracy, unbiasedness,
and the eciency of professional macroeconomic forecasts. We analyze a large panel
of individual forecasts that has not been analyzed in the literature so far. We provide
evidence on the properties of forecasts for all G7 counties and for four dierent macro-
economic variables. Our results show a high degree of dispersion of forecast accuracy
across forecasters. We also nd that there are large dierences in the performance of
forecasters not only across countries but also across dierent macroeconomic variables.
In general, forecasts tend to be biased in situations where forecasters have to respond
to large structural shocks or gradual changes in the trend of a variable. Furthermore,
while a sizable fraction of forecasters seem to smooth their GDP forecasts signicantly,
this does not apply to forecasts made for other macroeconomic variables.




In this paper, we use survey data to analyze the accuracy, eciency, and unbiasedness of
professional macroeconomic forecasts in the G7 countries. We analyze individual forecasts
from large cross sections of professional forecasters, enabling us to throw light on the
heterogeneity across forecasters.
1 Moreover, our results are not aected by problems that
arise from the use of average, so-called consensus, forecasts (e.g., aggregation bias). Our
large data set has not been exhaustively used in the literature before. By using this
large amount of disaggregate data on individual macroeconomic forecasts, we are able to
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Germany, Tel: 0049-431-530349-7; jonas.dovern@kiel-economics.de. Johannes Weisser, Max Planck
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grateful to Helmut Herwartz, Christian Merkl, and two anonymous referees as well as to all participants
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1For a comparison of results for individual and average forecasts, see a previous version of this paper
(Dovern and Weisser, 2008).
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provide a much broader evidence base on the properties of macroeconomic forecasts than
has so far been available in the literature.
A weak point of the empirical literature, which uses survey data to assess the eciency
or unbiasedness of macroeconomic forecasts, is that there is only a limited number of
non-U.S. data sets providing information on forecasts. Consequently, existing evidence is
predominantly based on U.S. data. Notable exceptions are Harvey et al. (2001), who ana-
lyze a set of selected individual forecasts for the U.K. from the survey data set provided by
Consensus Economics; Gallo et al. (2002), who analyze the evolution of macroeconomic
forecasts for the U.S., the U.K., and Japan; Bowles et al. (2007), who analyze the perfor-
mance of forecasts summarized in the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted by the
European Central Bank; Isiklar et al. (2006) or Ager et al. (2009), who use data from the
Consensus Economics data set on forecasts for a set of industrialized countries; Loungani
(2001), who additionally examines data for developing countries; Timmermann (2007),
who analyzes the performance of IMF forecasts from the World Economic Outlook for
various countries; Batchelor (2001), who compares the forecasts made by the IMF and the
OECD to private sector forecasts; and Boero et al. (2008a,b), who analyze forecasts from
the Bank of England Survey of External Forecasters. However, all existing international
studies, with the exception of Harvey et al. (2001) and Boero et al. (2008a,b), make ex-
clusive use of consensus forecasts rather than analyzing individual forecasts { these three
studies are, however, conned to U.K. data sets. The purpose of our paper is to ll this
gap, covering individual forecasts for all G7 countries and four macroeconomic variables.
Our results are based on an approach commonly used in the literature to model the
structure of macroeconomic forecasts, dating back to early contributions by Ball (1962),
Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969), Figlewski and Wachtel (1981), or Nordhaus (1987), who
introduced the basic modeling framework for analyzing xed event forecasts.
2 A sequence
of xed event forecasts consists of consecutively formed forecasts for the same event (such
as an annual gure for a macroeconomic variable). The data we use below is of this type.
2Pesaran and Weale (2006) and Stekler (2002) present concise summaries of the commonly used ap-
proaches. The latter contribution also provides an overview of the most prominent survey data sets used
in empirical research on forecast eciency.
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Some more recent contributions have proposed to improve the econometric approach for
testing the rationality of such large panels of xed event forecasts. These include Keane
and Runkle (1990) and Batchelor and Dua (1990), who introduce an analysis in a panel
framework using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) method, or Davies and
Lahiri (1995), who develop a framework for analyzing three-dimensional panels of survey
data, enabling the use of information along all dimensions. To ensure that our results are
comparable to existing studies, we closely follow the approach suggested by Davies and
Lahiri (1995), and recently used by Clements et al. (2007), Boero et al. (2008a), and Ager
et al. (2009), and suggest only minor modications to the econometric framework.
of the survey and test whether they are unbiased and ecient. Assuming that forecast
accuracy is the only objective of a forecaster and that her loss function is symmetric and
increases with the forecast error, the latter two properties are inevitable features of a
rational forecast. Regarding this point, it should be noted, however, that there are also
arguments against the assumption that published forecasts re
ect true expectations and
are meant to minimize a loss function of the described form. Some of these arguments
are as follows. First, forecasters might seek to maximize public attention. In this case,
an unbiased forecast is not optimal anymore, since the utility of the forecaster depends
on more than one argument (Laster et al., 1999). Second, forecasters might produce a
so-called \intentional" forecast in some situations (Stege, 1989). A forecaster could, for
example, predict a specic event to provoke a policy action that actually prevents the
occurrence of the event. Third, forecasters might have asymmetric loss functions (Capis-
tran and Timmermann, 2006, Boero et al., 2008a). These could have dierent weights
concerning a possible over- or underestimation of an outcome. We believe, however, that
these arguments are not a priori strong, particularly because in the data set we use the
identity of the panelists are revealed. We therefore abstract from these issues and start
this paper from the null hypothesis that it is in the forecasters' best interest to provide
unbiased and ecient forecasts.
Our ndings show that the dispersion of forecast accuracy across panelists is surprisingly
high for most (of the) countries and variables examined in this paper. We also nd that
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there are large dierences in the performance (in terms of accuracy, unbiasedness, and
eciency) of forecasters not only across countries but also across dierent macroeconomic
variables. In general, the forecasts for in
ation are mostly consistent with the hypothesis
of unbiased and ecient forecasts. Furthermore, forecasts tend to be biased in situations
where forecasters have to recognize large structural shocks or gradual changes in the trend
component of a variable.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section ?? presents a brief overview
of the data set we use and a rst visual inspection of the data. Section ?? illustrates the
econometric framework used by us to model the forecast errors, and how tests on the
unbiasedness and eciency of forecasts can be derived. Section 3 discusses the hetero-
geneity of accuracy of individual forecasts. Section 4 presents the empirical results on
the unbiasedness of individual forecasts. Section 5 presents the empirical results on the
eciency of individual forecasts. Section 6 concludes.
In this paper, we rely on data from the surveys conducted by Consensus Economics, a
London-based rm.
3 Each month, starting in October 1989, Consensus Economics polls
institutions like investment banks or economic research institutes about their forecasts for
the most common macroeconomic variables. The largest samples of panelists are available
for the G7 countries, on which we concentrate in this paper.
4 A considerable advantage
of the data set is that the data are comparable across countries as well as panelists.
Due to the fact that Consensus Economics asks the panelists to report their forecasts
for the annual gures of the variables, the panel data set has a rather complex structure
in that observations are correlated across several dimensions, as shown below. More
specically, the panel has a three-dimensional structure of the kind introduced in Davies
and Lahiri (1995). For each country and variable we have an NTH-dimensional vector
3Information from the Consensus Economics data set have been used in a sequence of papers in recent
years to analyze the properties of macroeconomic forecasts. Most contributions, however, consider only
data on average forecasts but do not analyze individual forecasts. Notable exceptions are Lahiri and Sheng
(2008), who propose a model for disagreement among forecasters and estimate this based on individual
forecasts on GDP growth from the Consensus Economics data set; Batchelor (2007), who uses a similar
disaggregated data set to analyze the bias in forecasts for GDP growth; Dovern et al. (2009), who analyze
the dispersion of macroeconomic forecasts; and, to some extent, Harvey et al. (2001), who analyze the
properties of forecasts made by a selected group of panelists from the Consensus Economics data for the
U.K.
4The average number of panelists ranges from 14 for Canada to 30 for the United Kingdom.
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Notes: This shows schematically the sequence of forecast (ft;h) and forecast revisions (rt;h)
of one forecaster for the realizations of a variable in two consecutive years (t1 and t2).
of forecasts for T years made by N forecasters with forecast horizons ranging from 1 to
H months. In other words, for each year a sequence of H forecasts is collected from each
forecaster, starting H months before the year ends and ending with the last month of that
respective year. In our case, we have a sequence of H = 24 forecasts from each panelist
for each variable's annual gures. In our sample, we include forecasts for the years 1991 {
2005, i.e., T = 15 in our analysis. The number of panelists covered by the data set varies
considerably across countries but also over time; however, usually N  10 even for the
smaller countries. Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the forecast structure for one
panelist and two consecutive target years.
We concentrate on forecasts for four variables: the annual growth rate of gross do-
mestic product (GDP), the annual in
ation rate, and the annual growth rates of private
consumption expenditure and industrial production, respectively. It is important to note
that some changes occurred in the denition of the target variables in some of the coun-
tries. More specically, while the in
ation forecasts refer to the consumer price in
ation
in general, the relevant gure which had to be forecasted in the U.K. referred to the
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 091ACCURACY, UNBIASEDNESS AND EFFICIENCY OF MACROECONOMIC FORECASTS 6
Retail Price Index during the rst period of our sample. Forecasts for CPI in
ation in
the U.K. were introduced in 2004.5 Furthermore, forecasters were asked to target the
annual growth rate of the gross national product (GNP) rather than that of the gross
domestic product (GDP) in Germany and Japan until 1992 and 1993, respectively. With
regard to the German forecast, there is another break in the data due to the switch from
data for former West Germany to data for reunied Germany. In our data set, forecasts
for GDP growth and in
ation refer to West Germany until 1996; for forecasts on private
consumption expenditures and industrial production, the change was made in 1995.
A feature of the data we are concerned with is given by the fact that the record of most
of the forecasters includes a set of missing values, i.e., the panel is heavily unbalanced.
There are two reasons for this. First, the set of panelists engaged in the Consensus
Economics survey changes continuously. Hence there are some forecasters entering the
panel at a later stage, while others leave the panel after the rst part of the period covered
by our data set. Second, some forecasters do not submit their forecasts on a regular basis,
i.e., they do not submit them for certain months. To minimize the reduction of our data
base due to this aspect, we interpolate a missing value when a forecast is unavailable for
one month and the two adjacent forecasts are equal to each other. Formally, if fi;t;h is
missing and fi;t;h+1 = fi;t;h 1, we set the missing forecast equal to fi;t;h+1. For the analysis
below, we include those panelists in the sample who made a forecast at more than 50% of
the possible dates. We thereby avoid the in
uence of small sample problems which could
arise from those panelists who submitted only a few forecasts.6
A nal issue regarding data concerns the realizations we use to evaluate the forecast
errors. For the evaluation of macroeconomic forecasts, it has become standard in the
literature to use data from the initial releases rather than revised ex post data (see,
e.g., Croushore, 2006). Following this approach, we compute forecast errors based on
the historical data as listed in the publications of Consensus Economics in May of each
subsequent year, respectively, since these data vintages should re
ect the initial releases
5An additional change occurred in May 1997 when the underlying Retail Price Index changed to a version
that excludes interest payments on mortgages.
6The threshold of 50% is, of course, arbitrary. Results for the included panelists are, however, robust to
the inclusion of more forecasters in the sample used.
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for all cases. To give an example: we use the realizations of variables for 1996, as reported
together with the survey results by Consensus Economics in May 1997, to evaluate all
forecasts that have been made for a variable's realization in 1996 for the years 1995 and
1996.
Figure 2 shows these rst data releases together with three Box-Whisker plots for each
year that depict the distribution of forecasts for h = 24;12;1, respectively. Four aspects
are clear from a visual inspection of the data. First, the forecast dispersion diminishes
considerably when the forecast horizon approaches zero, i.e., the height of the box is
usually largest for h = 24 and smallest for h = 1. Second, quite often even the last
forecasts made for a specic year (with h = 1) are quite distant from the rst data
releases. Third, the majority of forecasters seem to lag behind when structural changes
occur, i.e., when the unconditional expectation of a variable changes. This is exemplarily
shown in the graph for in
ation forecasts in the U.K. for the period between 1991 and
1994; the forecasts for real GDP growth and the growth rate of private consumption in the
U.S. between 1996 and 2000; or the forecasts for real GDP growth in Germany between
2001 and 2003. Finally, the gure illustrates the well-known phenomenon that turning
points are usually not forecasted in advance. This is particularly pronounced for turning
points in real economic activity, as can be seen, for instance, in the case of the recessions
in Germany (1993), Canada (1991), Italy (1993), the U.K. (1991), or the U.S. (2001).
2. Model Framework
2.1. A Structural Model for Forecast Errors. As mentioned above, our panel pos-
sesses a three dimensional structure of the kind introduced in Davies and Lahiri (1995).
Following conventional notation, we denote a forecast made by forecaster i = 1;:::;N
with a forecast horizon of h = 1;:::;H for the realization of the variable of interest
in target year t = 1;:::;T by fi;t;h. The stacked vector of forecasts is denoted by
F = [f1;1;H;f1;1;H 1;:::;f1;1;1;f1;2;H;:::;f1;T;1;f2;1;H;:::;fN;T;1]
0 and NTH entries long.
Following Davies and Lahiri (1995), we assume that the forecast error for each forecast
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can be decomposed into three dierent parts
ei;t;h  At   fi;t;h = i + t;h + i;t;h ; (1)
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Notes: First data releases are represented by solid lines. The items of the Box-Whisker-
plots have the usual meaning. The box indicates the upper and lower quartile, whereas the
Whiskers indicate the remaining distribution of observations but are restricted to be 1.5
times as long as the interquartile range. Outlier are not displayed to retain clarity.
where At denotes the realization of a variable for year t. The rst error component i is
the individual bias of the forecasts made by forecaster i. The second error component t;h
is common to all forecasters and re
ects the occurrence of macroeconomic shocks that
hit an economy between the date at which the forecasts are made and the end of year t.
Following the literature, we assume that these shocks are cumulated over the h months in
an arithmetic way, so that this component can be written as t;h =
Ph
k=1 ut;k. We assume
that ut;h is distributed with a zero mean and a variance of 2
u. Since ut;h and ut+1;h+12
occur at the same point in time, they will be correlated (Davies and Lahiri, 1995).
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The third error component i;t;h refers to the forecaster specic part of the forecast error
(apart of the constant bias). The literature proposes two alternative ways to model this
error. On the one hand, it can be seen as an independently and identically distributed (iid)
shock. This is the view taken for the estimation in Davies and Lahiri (1995). On the other
hand, Davies and Lahiri mention that one could assume that over time each forecaster
receives a 
ow of private information on the outcome, which successively decreases her
individual forecasting error. Under this assumption, one can model the forecaster-specic
error component as i;t;h =
Ph
k=1 i;t;k, where the i;t;k are distributed with mean 0 and
variance 2
i. Again, i;t;k and i;t+1;k+12 have a non-zero correlation, since these information
shocks occur at the same point in time.
It is clear that the two model variants for i;t;h have very dierent implications. In
the rst case, the forecaster-specic error components are assumed to be a white noise
process, while, in the second case, they are assumed to follow a random walk for each target
year t. In the rst case, there would be no correlation between consecutive forecaster-
specic error components, while, in the second case, the autocorrelation would be high
and decay only slowly for higher distances between two forecast errors for the same target
year. Intuitively, the second model is much more attractive: consider a forecaster whose
forecast is above the consensus forecast in one month. Is it not very likely that he will
publish an above-average forecast also in the following month? That is, it would be
very strange to think that individual forecasts 
uctuate randomly around the consensus
forecast without any persistence. Rather, a forecaster is likely to be persistently more
optimistic or pessimistic than the average for some time. This behavior would be better
captured by the second model, implying a high autocorrelation of the individual errors.
Ultimately, choosing from the two alternatives is a matter of empirical facts. In our data
set, the estimates of the forecaster-specic error components, say ^ i;t;h, show a fairly high
degree of autocorrelation. The empirical autocorrelation functions are usually declining
slowly and approach zero only after about twelve months. So we usually prefer the second
model to the rst based on Bayesian information criteria. In this respect, our econometric
framework deviates from other studies.
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2.2. A Test of Unbiasedness. Testing the unbiasedness of forecaster i is equivalent
to testing whether i = 0 in (1). We can examine this hypothesis by testing the zero
restriction on the elements of  = [1;:::;N]
0 in
e = A   F =  
 iTH +  +  |{z}
=
; (2)
where e is the vector of stacked forecast errors, A is given by iN 
 (A+ 
 iH) with A+ =
(A1;A2;:::;AT)
0 and iTH, iN and iH are vector of ones of dimension TH, N and H
respectively.7  and  are vectors of length NTH in which we stack the appropriate t;h
and i;t;h respectively.
Now, while a simple OLS regression gives consistent point estimates for the bias, we
cannot base our inference on the OLS standard errors, since the elements of  are clearly
not iid due to the special correlation structure caused by the structure of the panel data
set. Davies and Lahiri (1995) show that it is neither diagonal nor homoscedastic. Recalling
that due to our assumption about the individual errors our specication diers from their
model, we formally have the following elements of  = E[0] for two forecasters, say i
and j:


















> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
minfh1;h2g[2
u + 2
i] if i = j;t1 = t2;h1 = h2
minfh1;h2   12g[2
u + 2
i] if i = j;t1 = t2   1;h2  12
minfh1;h2g 2
u if i 6= j;t1 = t2;h1 = h2
minfh1;h2   12g 2
u if i 6= j;t1 = t2   1;h2  12
0 else
Clearly, the dierent non-zero cases deserve some more explanation. The forecast errors
 are correlated across several dimensions. First, they are correlated within the maximum
7The operator 
 denotes the Kronecker Product.
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forecast horizon H since t;h and i;t;h are the accumulation of period-specic shocks; this
refers to the rst case shown in (3). Second, the forecast errors are correlated between
subsequent years since the forecast horizons are of overlapping nature; this refers to
the second case shown in (3). Finally, the forecast errors are correlated across dierent
forecasters, since forecast errors are produced at the same time and are all subject to the
same subsequent aggregate shocks summarized by t;h; this refers to the third and fourth
case shown in (3).
Given , the covariance matrix of the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) esti-
mator is given by









and can be used to derive valid t-statistics for testing i = 0. Naturally,  is not observed
and has to be replaced by a consistent estimate, say ^ , before computation of the test
statistics is possible.




u. Davies and Lahiri (1995) propose to obtain a consistent estimate by
rst estimating these N + 1 parameters and then replacing the parameters in  by the
corresponding estimates. We will follow this approach. Note that an estimator of i is
simply given by the average forecast error of forecaster i and that we can estimate the











^ i;t;h = At   fi;t;h   ^ i   ^ t;h : (6)
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We can obtain estimates for the unknown parameters as the estimated coecients from
the following regressions using Ordinary Least Squares:
^   ^  = 
2
u H + ! (7)
^   ^  = (IN 
 H)
2 + ! ; (8)
where H = iT 
 [H;H   1;:::;1]
0 and 2 = [2
1;:::;2
N]0.
2.3. Test of (Weak) Eciency. For testing the eciency of the forecasts, we use the
concept of weak-form eciency that has been originally proposed by Nordhaus (1987).
The concept starts from the notion of strong eciency of forecasts which requires that
all information, which has been revealed at the time a forecast is made, is taken into
account during the forecasting process. In other words: If a series of forecasts is strongly
ecient, it would have not been possible to improve the forecast performance by using
any information available also to the forecaster. Since the amount of potentially relevant
information is immense and any selection for an empirical analysis would be ad-hoc,8
Nordhaus (1987) proposes to restrict the relevant information set to lagged values of the
forecasts themselves. He shows that under weak form eciency the revisions of forecasts
should be uncorrelated under certain assumptions. It should be intuitively clear that
for ecient forecasts the current forecast should not reveal any information on future
revisions { or as Nordhaus states (p. 673):
If I could look at your most recent forecasts and accurately say, \Your next
forecast will be 2% lower than today's", then you can surely improve your
forecasts.
Against this background, weak-form eciency of a sequence of forecasts can be formally
tested using an equation of the form
ri;t;h = i ri;t;h+k + i;t;h ; (9)
8Not to mention the problem of constructing large data sets with real-time vintages.
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where ri;t;h is dened as fi;t;h   fi;t;h+1, k  1, and i;t;h is the error term. The hypothesis
of weak-form eciency implies i = 0; a consistent estimate of i can be obtained by
the OLS estimator treating i;t;h as white noise. But again { due to the special structure




 = E[0], is non-diagonal and heteroscedastic.
To derive the exact form of , we rst note that, using (1), we can re-write the forecast
revisions as
ri;t;h = fi;t;h   fi;t;h+1 = t;h+1   t;h + i;t;h+1   i;t;h = ut;h+1 + i;t;h+1 : (10)
Now, it is evident that under the Null hypothesis i = 0 we obtain the following expres-
sions for the elements of :9
Cov (i;t1;h1;j;t2;h2) = Cov (ut1;h1+1 + i;t1;h1+1;ut2;h2+1 + j;t2;h2+1) (11)
Cov (i;t1;h1;j;t2;h2) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
2
u + 2
i if i = j;t1 = t2;h1 = h2
2
u + 2
i if i = j;t1 = t2   1;h1 = h2   12
2
u if i 6= j;t1 = t2;h1 = h2
2
u if i 6= j;t1 = t2   1;h1 = h2   12
0 else
(12)
Given , the covariance matrix for the GMM estimator of  can be written as
















0 and  = [1;:::;N]
0. V ar(^ )
can be used to derive valid t-statistics for testing i = 0. Naturally,  is not observed
9Note that at this point the assumption of private information for i;t;h is crucial for the result that
under weak-form eciency i = Cov(ri;t;h;ri;t;h+1) = Cov(ut;h+1 +i;t;h+1;ut;h+2 +i;t;h+2) = 0. Under
the assumption that the i;t;h represent ordinary iid shocks we would get i = Cov(ut;h+1 + i;t;h+1  
i;t;h;ut;h+2 + i;t;h+2   i;t;h+1) =  2
i 6= 0.
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and has to be replaced by a consistent estimate, say ^ , before computation of the test
statistics is possible.
To obtain ^  we can use the same method that we used to derive ^ . First, we derive
estimates for the single elements of  and replace these elements in a second step by their
estimates to consistently estimate . Note that the structure of  is much more simple






































^ i;t;h = ri;t;h 1   ^ ut;h : (17)
Given this formal framework, we will now move to the empirical analysis of the macroe-
conomic forecasts in the G7 countries.
3. Forecast Accuracy
3.1. Individual Forecast Accuracy. We can compute measures of forecast accuracy
for each panelist based on the individual forecasting errors ei;t;h = At   fi;t;h. To limit
the amount of information, we restrict ourselves to the forecasts with h = 12 in the
remainder of this section. The root mean squared forecast error (RMSE) is one of the
standard measures to analyze the accuracy of a panelist's forecasts. We compute it for
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Figure 3. Histograms of RMSEs across Panelists








































































































































































































Notes: This shows the histograms of the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) across panelists
for forecasts for dierent variables and countries. The y-axis indicates absolute frequencies.
Figure 3 shows histograms of the individual RMSEs for each variable and country. It
is surprising that the distribution of forecast accuracy across panelists does not follow a
bell-shaped pattern for most of the cases.
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In general, the dispersion of forecast accuracy is quite large. Especially for forecasts
of changes in industrial production and the forecasts for all variables in the U.K. the
distance between the best and worst RMSEs is substantial. Most extreme examples are
the forecasts for industrial production in Japan (2.8), the U.S. (2.2), Germany (2.1), and
the U.K. (1.9), but also forecasts for less volatile variables such as real GDP growth in the
U.K. (1.6), private consumption growth in the U.K. (1.4), or in
ation in Italy (1.3). This
rst impression is further conrmed by the fact that the kurtosis of a sizable fraction of the
distributions of RMSE across panelists considerably exceeds that of a normal distribution,
indicating distributions of RMSEs with high density for extreme observations (Table 1).
On average, kurtosis is highest for the forecasts for Germany (3.82), the U.K. (3.50), and
for forecasts of the in
ation rate (3.92). In addition, the distribution of forecast accuracy
is considerably skewed in many cases, e.g., in case of in
ation forecasts in Canada, France,
or the U.K., and forecasts for real GDP growth in France or the U.S. However, we do
not observe any systematic pattern of skewness. It seems to be a function neither of the
dierent variables nor of the countries, and there is no tendency that forecasts are skewed
more to the right or left.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on the Distribution of RMSEs across Panelists
Gross Domestic Product In
ation
Mean Med. Skew. Kurt. Max Min Mean Med. Skew. Kurt. Max Min
Germany 1.12 1.10 0.10 2.66 0.87 1.43 0.56 0.56 0.19 3.01 0.44 0.71
Canada 1.41 1.44 -0.22 2.04 1.14 1.71 0.77 0.81 -1.03 3.37 0.37 1.01
France 1.09 1.12 -1.07 4.86 0.46 1.46 0.55 0.54 1.01 3.79 0.45 0.73
Italy 1.01 1.00 0.79 2.57 0.94 1.14 1.29 1.30 -0.40 5.24 0.60 1.90
Japan 1.64 1.65 -0.38 1.69 1.32 1.90 0.49 0.47 0.93 3.38 0.34 0.75
UK 1.18 1.16 0.06 2.98 0.41 2.06 0.63 0.58 1.19 4.99 0.25 1.38
USA 1.21 1.24 -1.10 3.62 0.89 1.43 0.62 0.61 0.80 3.64 0.46 0.93
Industrial Production Private Consumption
Mean Med. Skew. Kurt. Max Min Mean Med. Skew. Kurt. Max Min
Germany 2.54 2.57 -0.66 4.26 1.30 3.40 1.09 1.09 -1.15 5.35 0.69 1.28
Canada 3.22 3.25 -0.34 2.01 2.78 3.60 1.25 1.22 0.73 3.31 1.05 1.60
France 2.54 2.50 0.16 1.68 2.31 2.78 0.74 0.71 0.49 2.47 0.55 1.02
Italy 3.27 3.34 -0.49 1.54 3.04 3.44 1.14 1.13 0.04 2.00 0.90 1.37
Japan 4.63 4.64 -0.07 2.92 3.18 5.95 1.32 1.31 0.70 3.03 1.10 1.64
UK 2.53 2.57 0.38 3.24 1.70 3.58 1.39 1.36 0.14 2.77 0.66 2.07
USA 2.29 2.41 -0.54 2.74 1.06 3.27 1.20 1.25 -0.11 2.16 0.98 1.47
Notes: All statistics refer to those RMSEs that correspond to the forecasts made with h = 12.
It would therefore be valuable to know, if there is any systematic pattern of (relative)
forecast accuracy of a forecaster's performance across variables. To answer this question,
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we show the correlations across panelists between any pairs of forecasts for two variables.
High positive correlation coecients would indicate that a forecaster who performs badly
in terms of accuracy for one variable is also likely to perform badly for the other variable.
Our results show that overall there are no high correlations between the forecast perfor-
mance across variables{only about one quarter of the cross correlations are signicantly
dierent from zero (Table 2). One notable observation is, however, that 7 out of 10 sig-
nicant correlations relate to cases involving the forecasts for real GDP growth. In all of
the 7 cases, the correlation is signicantly positive, indicating that more accurate GDP
forecasts go together with more accurate forecasts for the other variables. This is, to some
extent, not surprising, given that real GDP is the central variable in any business cycle
forecasting model. This observation leads us to conclude that there is a tendency that
those forecasters who have a suitable model for predicting real GDP growth also perform
well in terms of forecast accuracy for other variables.
Table 2. Correlation of RMSEs across Variables
Germany Canada France
GDP INFL IP CONS GDP INFL IP CONS GDP INFL IP CONS
GDP - -0.18 0.41 0.20 - 0.47 -0.46 0.20 - 0.16 -0.15 0.56
INFL 0.36 - -0.29 0.42 0.53 - -0.98 0.34 0.70 - -0.68 0.43
IP 0.03* 0.14 - -0.31 0.54 0.02* - -0.51 0.72 0.06 - -0.37
CONS 0.31 0.03* 0.11 - 0.80 0.66 0.49 - 0.15 0.29 0.37 -
Italy Japan UK
GDP INFL IP CONS GDP INFL IP CONS GDP INFL IP CONS
GDP - 0.54 0.16 0.86 - 0.50 0.78 0.54 - 0.21 0.56 0.75
INFL 0.17 - -0.52 0.66 0.08 - 0.74 0.44 0.29 - 0.16 0.01
IP 0.71 0.19 - 0.00 0.00** 0.00** - 0.53 0.00** 0.41 - 0.36
CONS 0.01** 0.07 0.99 - 0.06 0.13 0.06 - 0.00** 0.96 0.06 -
US
GDP INFL IP CONS
GDP - -0.14 0.50 0.59
INFL 0.55 - -0.10 -0.08
IP 0.02* 0.68 - 0.35
CONS 0.00** 0.75 0.12 -
Notes: Numbers above the diagonals indicate Pearson correlation coecients computed across panelists;
numbers below the diagonals denote the corresponding p-values for a test of zero-correlation.  and 
indicate signicance on the 5%- and 1%-level. The correlations refer to those RMSEs corresponding to
the forecasts made with h = 12.
4. Forecast Unbiasedness
4.1. Individual Forecast Unbiasedness. In this section, we present the empirical re-
sults on the bias of the individual forecasts. For the estimation, we follow Davies and
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 091ACCURACY, UNBIASEDNESS AND EFFICIENCY OF MACROECONOMIC FORECASTS 19
Lahiri (1995) and deal with missing values by simply deleting the appropriate elements in
the vectors of forecast errors e and the corresponding rows and columns in the covariance
matrix , respectively. The compressed matrices can be directly used to compute the
estimates and corresponding standard errors (Blundell et al., 1992).
The analysis of the biases present in the individual forecasts reveal some notable dif-
ferences across countries as well as variables. The results are summarized in Table 3.10
In general, most of the individual forecasts are unbiased. The overall performance is best
for the in
ation forecasts. There are very few biased forecasters for Canada, France, the
U.K., and the U.S. Rather surprising is the good performance of in
ation forecasts for
Italy, which underwent a signicant transition from a high to a low in
ation regime during
the early sample period. One might have imagined that forecasters adjusted only slowly
to the new environment, causing forecasts to be biased upwards.
This expected behavior is similar to what can be observed for the in
ation forecasts in
the U.K., where in
ation was also very high at the beginning of our sample period and
then declined considerably to low levels in the mid 1990s. All but three panelists, who
entered the sample rather late, overestimated in
ation on average. After all, only 2 out
of 30 did so signicantly on a 95% condence level.
A similar argument applies to the bias found in most of the forecasts for GDP growth
in the European countries. Here the wide majority of forecasters overestimated growth
on average. This phenomenon is most pronounced in Germany and Italy, but applies to
a lesser extent also to France. The same is also true of the forecast for the growth of
private consumption in Germany. Batchelor (2007) shows that this kind of bias can be
inevitable in an environment of declining trend growth rates, since forecasters have to
gradually realize the new trend.
A complex picture arises from the combination of forecasts for GDP growth and the
growth of industrial production in the U.K. While forecasts for the former are generally
unbiased, the results for the latter yield strong evidence for rejecting the hypothesis of
unbiased forecasts; most panelist on average overestimate growth of industrial production
10Detailed results with respect to individual panelists are available on request.
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Table 3. Bias of Individual Forecasts
Gross Domestic Product In
ation
# obs # bias(+) # bias(-) mean var # obs # bias(+) # bias(-) mean var
Germany 29 0 7 -0.49 0.021 30 0 0 -0.06 0.011
Canada 14 0 0 -0.27 0.020 14 0 3 -0.20 0.054
France 17 0 4 -0.40 0.016 17 0 2 -0.14 0.021
Italy 11 0 10 -0.61 0.002 11 0 0 0.20 0.010
Japan 13 0 0 -0.22 0.042 13 0 0 -0.13 0.011
UK 30 0 0 -0.25 0.025 30 0 2 -0.20 0.025
USA 22 0 0 0.23 0.023 22 0 1 -0.08 0.028
Industrial Production Private Consumption
# obs # bias(+) # bias(-) mean var # obs # bias(+) # bias(-) mean var
Germany 28 0 0 -1.00 0.078 29 0 18 -0.52 0.039
Canada 4 0 0 -0.93 0.120 14 0 0 0.03 0.051
France 8 0 2 -0.98 0.093 17 0 0 -0.18 0.008
Italy 8 0 4 -1.53 0.048 11 0 0 -0.40 0.005
Japan 13 0 0 -1.26 0.089 13 0 0 -0.31 0.012
UK 28 0 22 -1.40 0.056 29 0 0 0.15 0.033
USA 21 0 0 -0.46 0.077 22 10 0 0.51 0.019
Notes: #obs indicates the number of individual panelists, #bias(+)=( ) indicate the number of them
that provides signicantly upward/downward biased forecasts. mean and var indicate the mean and the
variance of the biases across panelists.
by about 1 to 1.5 percentage points. This might re
ect the fact that although the trend
growth of overall output remained relatively constant over the sample, there was a shift in
the structural composition of the economy in the U.K. from production-oriented sectors
toward services { especially toward the nancial sector { which had to be realized by the
forecasters. A similar phenomenon can be observed when comparing forecasts on GDP
growth for the U.S., which are generally unbiased, to forecasts for growth of private con-
sumption in the U.S., which tend to underestimate consumption growth. Again, it seems
that it was dicult for a large number of panelists to anticipate the gradual decline in the
saving rate of private households as well as to properly estimate additional consumption
eects of huge increases in household wealth caused by the stock market boom of the late
1990s and the real estate boom from 2002 until the end of our sample.
In general, we can conclude that biased forecasts are apparently produced in times of
structural shocks or gradual changes which have to be realized by the forecasters.
11 On
the contrary, forecasts seem to be generally unbiased for stable economies without large
structural shocks. One example is Canada where the structure of the economy and the
11This source of bias in macroeconomic forecasts is also supported by results in Andolfatto et al. (2008),
who analyze the properties of articial forecast generated within a standard dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model.
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medium-term growth trend have not fundamentally changed since the introduction of
in
ation targeting in 1991. As a consequence, there are only 3 (out of 46) cases among all
forecasts for the Canadian economy, in which the panelists produced biased forecasts.
5. Forecast Efficiency
5.1. Individual Forecast Eciency. For testing weak eciency of individual forecasts,
we follow the literature (Clements, 1997, Harvey et al., 2001, Isiklar et al., 2006) by setting
k in Eq. 9 equal to 1. Indeed, this makes sense since by the time a new revision is made,
each forecaster knows about his most recent forecast revision. The results are summarized
in Table 4.12
Our analysis of individual forecasts' properties in terms of weak eciency reveals an
interesting contrast between the forecasts made for GDP growth and those made for the
other variables under investigation in this paper. For the majority of forecasts on the
growth of industrial production and private consumption as well as the in
ation rate,
we cannot reject the hypothesis of weakly ecient forecasts; only few series of forecasts
show a signicant correlation between successive forecast revisions. In those cases, the
estimated coecient is mostly negative, indicating that the forecasters in question tend
to overreact to incoming news, i.e., at rst, they overly revise their forecasts, undoing
part of this revision during the next forecasting round.
In contrast, we nd more evidence for deviations from weak eciency for forecasts
of GDP growth in all counties but Japan.
13 The main dierence is, however, that the
estimated coecients are positive in all but one of the signicant cases. Accordingly,
those forecasts for GDP growth that deviate from weak eciency show a strong tendency
toward forecast smoothing in general. This indicates that forecasters tend to process
new information only slowly, which results in positively autocorrelated revisions.
14 Gallo
et al. (2002) nd that forecasters tend to stick to their previous forecasts even when
12Again, detailed results for all individual panelists are available on request.
13The fact that we nd weakly ecient forecasts for GDP growth in Japan is in contrast to the results
of Ashiya (2003), who analyzes the reaction of forecasters to news of GDP growth in a slightly dierent
modeling framework and based on a dierent set of private sector forecasts; he concludes that forecasters
tend to signicantly overreact to new information.
14In psychology, this phenomenon is also known as conservatism (Phillips and Edwards, 1966, Edwards,
1968).
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Table 4. Eciency of Individual Forecasts
Gross Domestic Product In
ation
# obs # ine(+) # ine(-) mean var # obs # ine(+) # ine(-) mean var
Germany 24 9 0 0.10 0.007 26 0 4 -0.03 0.009
Canada 12 5 0 0.13 0.011 13 0 1 -0.03 0.008
France 15 9 0 0.15 0.014 15 1 1 -0.01 0.008
Italy 10 2 0 0.05 0.010 10 0 1 -0.01 0.004
Japan 10 0 0 0.02 0.003 11 0 1 -0.07 0.004
UK 26 6 1 0.07 0.012 25 0 7 -0.08 0.023
USA 21 8 0 0.10 0.009 20 1 3 -0.05 0.013
Industrial Production Private Consumption
# obs # ine(+) # ine(-) mean var # obs # ine(+) # ine(-) mean var
Germany 23 3 3 -0.03 0.019 27 0 9 -0.10 0.009
Canada 2 0 0 0.02 0.014 12 0 1 -0.02 0.006
France 7 1 1 0.01 0.014 15 2 1 0.02 0.007
Italy 7 1 2 -0.01 0.020 10 0 1 -0.03 0.006
Japan 10 0 0 0.02 0.003 10 0 0 -0.03 0.002
UK 24 2 2 0.02 0.011 24 1 2 -0.01 0.010
USA 20 1 3 -0.02 0.013 20 1 1 0.02 0.007
Note: #obs indicates the number of individual panelists, # ine(+)/(-) the number of them that provides
signicantly weakly inecient forecasts with positive/negative autocorrelated revisions. mean and var
indicate the mean and the variance of the estimated autocorrelation coecients across panelists.
controlling for the most recently observed average forecast and the dispersion of forecasts.
Batchelor and Dua (1992) rationalize such forecasting behavior, noting that in reality
forecasters might not have a single objective, which is to minimize the expected squared
errors. Moreover, they are likely to take into account that their clients might \mistrust
forecasters who make frequent [erratic] revisions to forecasts" (p. 179). The fact that
the GDP growth forecast is usually the part of a comprehensive macroeconomic forecast
report published by a forecaster, which is anticipated most by clients or the media, might
result in just this behavior and make forecasters deviate most from their true expectations
out of incentive and reputation considerations. This would explain why we nd a strong
tendency for forecast smoothing only for forecasts on GDP growth.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed individual macroeconomic forecasts for all G7 countries
based on survey data from the Consensus Economics data set. We have shown the degree
of heterogeneity across panelists with respect to forecast accuracy and tested whether the
forecasts in the sample are unbiased and weakly ecient. The empirical results lead us
to the following conclusions.
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First, the dispersion of forecast accuracy is surprisingly high. Second, we observe that
forecasters who perform well in terms of forecast accuracy for real GDP growth are also
likely to perform well for other variables. Third, we nd large dierence in the performance
of forecasters with respect to unbiasedness and eciency across countries and dierent
macroeconomic variables. Fourth, among the four kinds of forecasts analyzed, in
ation
forecasts perform best in terms of unbiasedness. Fifth, forecasters, on average, seem to
smooth their GDP forecasts more heavily relative to the other macroeconomic forecasts
they make. Sixth and last, forecasts tend to be biased in situations where forecasters
have to realize large structural shocks or gradual changes in the trend of a variable. As
a consequence, if a sizeable fraction of panelists produce biased forecasts for a variable,
then virtually all of them are biased in the same direction, i.e., biases are not uncorrelated
across panelists.
There are several dimensions along which this research could be expanded in the future.
For simplicity, we have assumed that the variance of the macroeconomic shocks (t;h) as
well as the variance of the forecaster-specic error component (i;t;h) decay linearly if h
goes to 1. First, more general functional forms could be developed in the future to better
match the data. Second, as soon as a sucient number of longer time series become
available for forecasters of individual forecasts, one could implement the estimation of
horizon-specic bias, which would be more attractive from a theoretical point of view.
Currently, however, the time dimension of the data set is too small, that is, for most of
the panelists the estimates would be based on fewer than ten observations. Finally, taking
into account correlations across countries { as Isiklar et al. (2006) do in their analysis of
consensus forecasts { would clearly be desirable, given the high impact that international
shocks potentially have on the size of forecast errors. However, this would require immense
computational power for the estimation of the covariance matrices.
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